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TO .SEARCH OR NOT TO SEARCH 
1. Introduction 
In many real situations the assumption usually mille \hat all &;JeI1\s are 
cosllessly Informed about the prices at which others are willing to trede is 
clear Iy non \ereole. When Information is costly It beComes much more dlffleulHo 
unoors\jOd the mechanism by which decentralized price decisions will aeneralMn 
equilibrium, and analYse Its properties. Iaooress here informational problems In 
markets like the housing market or the "used car" market Simple observation 
suggests that In housing markets Important Informational aSpects are Involved. 
Tha resources that go 1010 "looklng fer a house" ara substantial and an lmportant 
brokerage Industry developed, one of whose matn functions can be seen as 
substituting for this costly search. I wHl concentrete on price dlsper~IOI1 and 
assume 'sub-markets' of Mmqnrous houoos.6uyers and sellers in this market 
must spend resources looking f?r Irading opportunities. They may know the 
relevant price distribution prevailing at each moment In the market, but must 
engage In costly search Ie order to l<:cot~ trading partners. An equilibrium ariseS 
characterized by price d.,petsion, vacanollls and unsatisfied demand. 
Search mOCels have been exlooslvelly used to charooterlze the Individual 
behaviour In these Circumstances, and I will assume that beth buyers and sellers 
will follow a reservation price rule, while searching. The emphasis, however. IS 
not In the Individual behaviour, but In the market equilibrIum. A !)1Od 
understanding of the Informat!onal structure of the housing market requjres some 
departure from the usual literature. In which stores and customers face ~ 
other. Buyers and sellers are seen as drawn from the same population, and a much 
more symmelriC case ariSes. 
The brokerage industry is modeled as a substitute for the search octlvlty 
of the &;JeI1IS In Ihe market Buyers and sellers eIln use the brokers services. for a 
price, and avoid the neoo to search. The 1lroker~ Industry has not r"""lveo much 
2 
attention and has !)3neraly been analylBd In isolatIon (Ytnger ( 1981)), Here I 
claim that the proper understanding 01 this market requires the simultaneous 
analysIs of the brokers' lleClslon and !loW 1!\eV alfect ana are ellectoo by the 
equilIbrium generated In the search markel 
/
/ 
/ 
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2. Search Equlllbrhlm: An Overylew 
Buyers aM sellers are drawn from the same population. end enter the 
market at tile same rate. TM model to be developed addresses the question of price 
dispersion, but not the price level in this market. We can assume that the everage 
price w1l11liJjust In response to exC8SS demand, equillbrating total entrance rates 
·of bl.lYSfs end sellers. 
Aller entering the market all agents wltl make the some search effort. 
which is token to be constant In time. However, different poople wi11 have 
different costs for t~ls effort. The populat1on Is distributed. by effort cost 
according to the cumulatlvo E(e),c E [O.c,,] (and p.d.!. a(e) = dEfde). The now of 
both buyers and sellers entering the market will follow Ihls dlslrlbut1on. 
/ 
k; a resull of this ",arch ect"lIy a cerlaln number of contacts, per unil 
of time, Is made by eooh agent. After a while, and accorrJlng to a rule \0 be, 
speemed below. a contact wl11 be successfun, and both agents leme Ihe market. 
,seners and buy£cs ¥1m stay for a lim. in the mrtet (I.e.. __eIling). 
Let S(B) be the number of se;]ars (buyers), that ara currently enlJ6illng in 
searell. Sellers with dIfferent effort costs wlll follow different strategies, and 
wl11 searCh for. different amount of time. The populalon S( B) is then distributed 
byefforl costs, but following a dlstributlon that differs from E( .). Let F(c) and 
f(c), C £ [O,c"] be the cumul'ltlve and p.d.!. for Sand G( bJ, g(b), b e [O,b"] for B. 
Simm"try conditions imposod !.t"" wl11 moke theSBdlstributi(llls equal, for much 
of the analySis. 
Although the cost of each unll of search effort Is given, for agiven agent, 
Ihe number of contacts he Is ab Ie to make in each unit of tIme depends, through the 
search tecilnology, on the number of agents engaging in search In bolh siOOs of the 
merket. The seJrch costs of eooh agent (i.e. the cost of one contact) are thus 
enrogensous. This cher!l:lerlstlc of the mtdll - In fact a sort of network 
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externality - w!11 have Important consequoooes. 
Clearly It makes no sense for a seller to enijage In search (e.g. by puttIng 
ads on a newspaper) If no potential buyer is also engaging in search (e.g. by 
answering ods). 
The search technology, together with the number of searchers (8,5) end 
their dlstrlbuUon (F ,0) will determIne the quit rales. Those must be equal to the 
antranco rates, E(.), for an equilibrium to obtain. The equilibrium condition will 
thus determine Ihe values of B· and S and Ihe distribution F and Q The 
equilibrating mecMnlsm Is OOstrtbed below. 
All sellers are BSS1Jme!l 10 have the same knowlocl;Je atlout the search 
market condltlons ThW f~ a known dls(ributlon of buyerS' reservation prlre<;, 
~ 
N(y). facing thls same dimrlbutlon, ""Ilers with dm....nl effort costs wm dec.de 
on different reservation prices. x. This leads to a dlstriDe'lion of BSl:lng prices, 
N(x). Buyers, IllCing this 'dlstrlbutlon, w!11 also deci<ll diffe...ntly on their 
reservaUon prices, generating N( y) In turn. 
When eseller and, Owe<' meet, a.bargal,ling process takes place If x , y 
no transaction is posslole and ooth resume search. 11 x i y a transaction wl11 take 
place at a price t = Ax+( H.)y, with 1. c [0,1], and both quit the market. 
All sellers (buyers) make the serna searcn ellort, and thus the same 
number oloootacts. The total wmber of contacts mede In e<!:h unit 01 time Is gIven 
by the total population curr....tly engaging in search, through a search technology 
given by 
<1'0 (2.1 ) 
The $pOOlflC functional form has choson In such a w"f that T( 8,0) = T(O,S) • O. 
• 
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Th. function is symmelrlc in BandS, odmitlng Implicitly thai Ih. same search 
octivities are open to both buyerS end sellers. 
By appropriate choice of units, I will I"". flo· I, with !l() loss of 
generalily. Then, If o( b) is the effort cost of a sellar (buyer), his seaNlh cost Is 
0 
"c. (2.2,8) 
S"-IB~ 
. 
b 
so· (2,2.b) 
S"B,,-I 
-/' 
Soarcl1 costs become llI100garlOOUS 10 Ih. model, and depand on Ih. total 
number of buyers end sel1erscurrenlly searching, No\loe that the search cost of 8 
seller with positive c becomes infinite os B~ 10 29ro. 
6 
3. SQl)!ll:.JlIld Buv!!I'6ehllylou[ 
I will assum~ that N(y). y £ {p'p"} Is 6 contlnous function and that n(y) 
=dN/d'I, 0 exists ( I). 1I>e searohlng populations are SBnd 8. and the sener win 
choose x*(e) by salving. 
max rr( ••e) • E{sale price - search cost) 

x 

8y asimple argument 
y-O(.) 
lI(X.C)·"x' (HI.)-- (3.1) 
Hi(.) i-N(.) 
where 
,/ 
/ 
,I 
v.f" ydN(y) and Q(,).!, ydN(y) 
p' p' 
A so:ution (x*(e» to this problem always exists and x*\c) Is a 
non-Increasmg function. If II(X,O) IS concave in x for any c. then x*(c) Is 
contlnuous. 
For interior solutions the first-order condition Is 
.~~ 0 
... I( H.)(y-Q(x»-x( Hi(x))) - ) = 0 (3.2) 
2 
[I-N(.)] sa-iS" 
(I) f'orod?!aileddise/!ssiOf/$i3fJLl/CeIIQ, 0 (/918) 
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1\ IS 1n general Impossible to I)'lt expltcttly x*(o), but It Is rather eas; to 
get c*( x), its inverse. 
The value of engaging In this proo'Jss of search, for a seller with effort 
cost CIS: 
I-N(x'(o» 
VIc) =n(x'(e),c) =x"(e) -A--- (3.3) 
n(x*(o)) 
TM (uneUon V( .lIS conUnuou$ and decreasing, with d2y1002 ~ 0, whenever \lils 
derlVattv8 exists. 
/
, 
Similar results can be obtalnw for the buyer. Assume thay foco • 
dlstrlbu!1on of sellers reservallon prices m(x), x t [p',p"], with mIx) = 
"dM\dx >O. A buyer sets his reserva!1on price in such • way as 
.max p (y ,b) 2 E{tranS1lCUon price' searctl cost} 

y 

Again by asimple argument 
R(y) b 
p(Y,b)· ),,--. (I-)"lv' ----, (34) 
M(y) S"Se-1 M(y) 
where 

y 

R(y)=J xdM(x) 

p' 
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Asolution Y*(b) to this problem will always exist, and y'U Is a 
nondecreastng function. If p(y,b) is convex in y f9l' any'b,y*(b) will be 
continuous For inlerior solutions the first order condil1on Is 
m(y) b 
(H.) + [1o.(yM(y) - R(y» - 1~ 0 (3.5) 
M2(y) S"B.... I 
Again It is Impossible to get explicitly V'(b), but It Is eIrS:'/ to obtain an 
analytical expression for b*( y), Its Inverse, The value of engaging in search, for 
a buyer with effort cost b will be 
/
I 
i 
M(y*(b» 
(3.6) 
m(y*eb)) 
The function y(.) Is continuous and Increasing, with d2y/db2 ; O. 
Sellers will have a IImlt value below which they Will not lllCept to 
participels in the market. If VIc) < Yi., where l'/. can be teken as the value of the 
next best use for the house, they will simply decide not to sell, AIS(), buyers will 
plooe an upper limit, Wabove which they will not accept to participate In the 
marke!.lf V(Il) , W, they will drop out 
9 
:1, Equlll~Ej4m~PJ:1l;e Distributions 
In equi1:brium, some relations must exist belwren the price dlstributlons 
and \110 distributions of the soorching populations by effort cost. It is Immediale 
, 
from \11. discussion above that 
He)= 1- H(x"(e)) ( 4.1..) 
{ (l{b) = N(y'(b)) (4.1.b) 
or, if x'(e) and y*( b) hove inverses' 
H(x) • 1 - F(c'(x») (4.2 .• ) 
{ N(y) - C(b'(y)) (42.8) 
/
/ 
Where c'(x) and b*( y) can easily be obtained from (3.2) and (3.5).·' 
. ; 
. We can look al (4.l.a,b) as a set of Inlegro-d1fferential €quallons that 
. ""\Brrnin. M(.) and N(.), given 8,S and the distributions F(.) and C(.). Now, F(.) 
and G(.) ore not Ihe exogeneous ""rlot,les of the model; the entrance rates are. The 
qull rates Implletl by the price dlstrlbutlons can easily be calculated. TaKe a seller 
wllh effort cost c. He sels x*(e) as his roservatlon price. He wlll make, on 
overage, acertain number of contacts, befONl he strikes a bargain: 
n(e)=--- (4.3) 
I-N(x"(e» 
In each unit of tlma he makes ~,-I B5 oontacts.. The, V9r89' time ha stays 
In the market is 
10 
.(c)=-- (44) 
S"-1 6" l-N(x*(c» 
The number of sellers with effort coots In (o.c+d:) Is Sf( c)dc. The QUlt rates CIIn 
be written as; 
Sf(el 
. q,,(e) = --= S"6"( I-N(x*(c» f(c) (4.5) 
.(c) . 
Similarly the buyers Quit rates are: 
/' 
Qb(b). S"B" M(y'(b)) g(b) / (4.6) 
If the quit rates are not equal to the exogenoous entrance retes. both lhe population 
.(B,S) and its distribution (F,G), w1l1 chanqe. Associated wlth those there are 
th00ges;,\ the pncc dls1rltctions. The process can be soon as adjusting through 
this mechanism. driven by the entrance rates. 
The Question of existence of equllibrium price dlslrlbutioos ceo be 
addressed by looking at equations (4.1 and 4.2) as a mapping of Y x Y ... Y x y. 
when YIs the space of all cumulative dlstributlons In r:I(:ii). Given the Searching 
populations. B.S and its distributions. F,G. take any (pel'Cfllved) pair of price 
distributions. (Mo.No)' The agents decisions wHl then generate. pair of 
distributions (HI,NI)' defining a conlioous mapping of Y x Y ... Y x Y. This 
. 
mapping can now take (MI.NI) Into (M2.N2) and so 01\ The argument now 
follows the proof developed by Kormendl (1979). USlng the supoorm as the 
melrlc. ttle set of all bounded functlons Is 8 Banach space. The set or 811 cumulative 
functions is a subset of this space which Is convex and f01'ms a linear metric 
11 
space. The closure of Y,'I. Is compoot. (y ts the set of functions that have the usuol 
properties of cumulatives, but hilYe right limits at the points 01 dlscoontlnulty). 
As far as our mappll1ills concerned, YIs equivalent to Y.·So by ScI1aU1ler theoram a 
fixed point exists In YxV... 'i x Y";applng, which Is In Y x Y .
. 
/ 
I 
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S. Ills !Inform Cllse; No Droter 
It IS reasonable to assume that, In many of these markets buyers 8M 
sellars are drawn from the SlIme population. Entrance rates will then be the same 
for both sides of the market, and distributed In the SlIme WrIY \ly effort costs. Gall 
He) end etc) the cumulative and p.d.f. of this distribution, This symmetry 
.suggest eCholce ofi. = 112. Nelurally, In equillbr,um, both ~rchlng PDP"I"l1oM 
will be the same, B=S=P, 8M distributed In the same WrIY. Gall F(c) and ftc) to 
the cumulative and p.dJ. of Ihis common distribution. Here I will analyse the cOse 
where the distribution EO Is uniform in a given Internal [O,c"]. This ceoo, 
althOugh particular, can lead 10 several tnterestlng outcomes, some of them with 
non-Intuitive results .bO\Jt the funo\lontng of this type ()[ markets. It has the big 
advantage of having aanalytical solution (bet can be easily computed, allowing for 
"rtcllness of analysis otherwise Impossible. In enother paper (Lucena ( 1988)) I 
try to assess how ganeral ara the results obtained here. For simplicity tal::e" 
~ 
= I 
In the search technology. ,! 
~ \ 
The Iotal numbers of buyers end sellbl's entering tM market, A, are 
distributed according to 
c 
E(c) =- e(c)=- , OE[O,C"] 
COO 
it Is vary fJIiSi to verl~ tMt uniform price distribUtions are conststent 
wIth unIform entranre rates. MOKt 
x-p' 
M(x) =NIx) = - , x t [p' ,p"] 
A 
13 
where LI = p"- p' is the spread of the price oistribu!ion. For symmetry reasons 
we can make 
p'+p. 'iI.'W 

p=-=­
2 2 
Using these distrlbutlons to compute optimal priCIng x'( e),y*( 0), eno 4. I, we 
get 
g 'o F(e)' -- (5.1l
3 LIP 
Notice tMt F(c") = I. By the equilibrium condltlon trn.t QUit rotes of buyers eno 
sellers are equal, and equal to the entrance rates, we gel 
./ 
/ 
j 
.' \ 
(5,2) • 
e 
He)= - , f(e)=- - etiC,c"] (53)
c" 2 cc"t; Iff 
(54) 
The optimal policy decisions are then: 
14 

(5,5) 
• 
2 c· 4 JOO' 
y·(c)-p---.-­
3 .f2Ii 3 ;ru, 
Bnd the "value of search", 
2 c" M 
V(c)";; + -:- --2­
3 .f'l}i, .f2Ii 
/ 
2 c· M I 
V(e)- ii -'--+ 2­
3.f'l}i, J"ZA 
We have 8 flow 01 Asell""s and buyl1r5 thrOU\jh the search market, I.e, we 
have Atransactions per unit of time, In each transection Illere is awelfare gain of 
Vi-':IJ.=w. If everybOOy deClOO to parlicipale In searCll the to\al welfare,l1lnerated 
by lhe martel, Ineach unit of tIme Is 
e-Aw-TS (5,7) 
where TS is the flow of total search costs, 
c· 2 
Ts"f 2PI(c)cOC=-/2Ac' (5,8) 
o 3 
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and 
2 
B=Aw-- mc" (5.9) 
3 
The last participant decideS to withdraw from searching 11 Y(c,,) (l'/, (or 
y(c") ) w). 
.Full part1cipatlon will take place If 
9 w 2 
-A(-) > I (5 10) 
32 c" 
For the moment Just assume this condition to hold. The de<;Jslim to 
participate wtil be more carefully analised together with the introduction of a 
broker. 
. 
It is interestmg to make some comparative statics mthe two parameters 
·that define the situation: Aand c". 
Start with an increase in A. Notica first that cP/M> 0, and so the total 
searching populat1on also increases In equilibrium. But F(.) does not depend on A 
(nor does It depend on ,,) being solely determined by E(.). 
As a consequenca of P increasing the search cost will decrease for 
everyone. Simultaneously, Is M/M ( 0: the prlca distribution will become more 
concantrated around p. Aslmple mterpretation of what 1S 9'lmg on 1S that the zero 
search cost people, who set the extreme reservat10n prlcas lose some of their 
"monopoly power" over the searchers with highest costs of the other side. 
Individual welfare then decreases for low search cost people (c ( c"/9) 
16 
""d Incr_ for high search cost ones (c ) 0"/9). Simultaneously optimal 
pricing policies ch~nge For the seller's side, searchars with low cost Mcrease 
this asking price (c {0"/4) and the other Increase the asking price. 
The flow of total search costs increases as expected, 3TS/"" ) O. But 
averlliJll search rosts decrease 3(TS/A)ICA { 0, So there is a welfare gain 
(oB/M>O), whim IS \0 be expected, but al$() a gam on averlliJll wellara 
o(Blp,)IO/\>Q, ThiS Is the result 01 the positive externallty that an Increase In P 
introduces by loworl ng everyone search costs. 
Notice hOwever that 3(TSIP)/0/\. 0, I.e., when the average IS taken for 
all m,rket parllcipants average search cost 00 nol chenge. This shows now carefull 
one must be whan taking averages In applied work. for we1fara analysis the 
averlliJll must be taken in the flow end not in the stock. 
/ 
The average time searching i • PIA • .rzrt;" Then CiIO/\ ( 0 and, on 
, 
average, poople slay less time 'in the market Actually this is true also for 
everYbody, fon( 0)- ( I N'Lli)rr:7Cls the !lVerage searching time as function Of 
c, and o.(c)/CA < O. ]his Is at a first Sight C\1Un1erlntuitive. Search costs 00 
. 
decrease for averyore, but Wetage time seaN:hlllg also decrease, fhe rooson 1S 
that the total (P) and average (PIA) number of contacts per unIt of time also 
Increase, while the total number of contacts before striking a bargaining (o(c) = 
';c"/e) does not change, 
Individual welfare of a ><lller, as a function of c, can be oooomposed as 
V(c)=p( c)~He), where ji(eJ " expec\oo sele Drlce and 1(e)' .(c)e=R/P Is 
total expected searCh rosts. Clearly ~T(e)IO/\ ( 0 for averyOOOy, SO Vee) must 
(ilcrease for low seerch cost sellers Actually ~(e)/3A' 0 tff e (4/90", 
The limitIng case, as A.... "" leoos 10 II - 0, all the transoc:llons al p, and 
V(c)=y(o)·ji Ind1VlOOal search costs (He» 0:> to zero, but iotal search costs 
17 
oon'[ because Aand P grow also Inoofiootly. However the benefits grow faster end 
lot~lwelrare Is unbounde!l. 
An Increase In c", without changIng A, has no .IIaclon p, The total number 
of searchers depends only on tot,1 entronce rates, and not 00 theIr distrIbution. 
Now 1M sprero of the price dlstribul10n increases: 3Moc" ) O. Zero effort cost 
~eople are now able to use \heIr Increased "monopoly power" wer the hIghest 
effort cost people 01 the other SJde 01 the merkl!!. 
Only the low efforl cost sellilrs will be better ofl (0 , 4/90"), while lor a 
fixoo c, the asking pr'''. will always Increase (ox*(e)loc") 0). Notice howtMlr 
that at the "now" c", tM esklng price IS smailer than It Ms at the "010" 
e"(dx'(e')/oo' , 0), as needed to be conslstsnt with zero effort cost people being 
better off. Totel welfare decreases, os total search costs per unlt of Ume Inet1laStl 
/ (oTS/oc' ) 0) whlla total number of sales Is \he same (A), with the same gross 
benefli (w). 
• 

·X'(C) VIc) 
0" c" 
1 2 
----"--'--+ 
c.. c.. c 
1 2 
Fig. 1: An Incroose in e" 
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AverllJi' lime in the market, ooas no! change. However, for fixed c, 
d.lc)/dc">O. "OM timers" stay I"'ger in the merkel, while the highest effort cost 
will stay the same OM perlen as before «\;( c")/oo" = 0). The two facts are mOOl 
compatible by e change in Ihe equilibrium distribution, F(c), thai decreases the 
relative whel~h\ of low search cost people. 
For any seiler total expect'" search cost lOcreases (dT(c)/dc" ) 0). The 
expected sale price increase for any fixed c, altr.ough the new c" searchers have 8 
smaller cxpected sa~e price. 
For "old tlmors" on thl) seller SIOO the expected sale price Increasss 
(;,p(0)/"," ) 0), but for the new "lost saller" it is now smaller than it was before 
(op( c")file" <0, as should be expectoo, for Ihis seller makes ooly one contoct end 
faces now a worS1l sjllJatjo~ 
/ 
! 
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6. Tb. Broker 
The broker Is &1 agent that offers to buy and sell Muses at gjven prices. 
Using the broKer's services avoids the need to usa CIlStly search; 
In a sYmmetriC equliibrium the broker must offer buying and selling 
prices that are symmetric m relatlOn \0 p. Otherwise he wlll get abigger flow of 
cHants en one of the sIdes, which Is not p01lSlble as loog term solutlrm, 
Coll s the price ot Which the broker buys houses. In eooIJ tr.nsection he 
makes 2q;~s). If tile total number of trorlllllctlons going through tile broker In n, 
In sooh un II cftlme, his prMlt Is 
,en) = 2(p-s)n - c(n) (6,
,
I) 
In en equ11lbrlum where search and the broker exist, the high effort cost 
agent? will be the OIles us109 tile broker. Coll ce(s) the limlllng effort ~t: 
c" 
n=J Ae(c)<lo=A(I-E(Ce(s»] (6.2) 
'1;(s) 
The flow of people enlerlng the search markel Is now given by AE(c,,). And 
tIley are distributed accordl~g 10 ["(c)·E(cl/E(Ce). The searth eQUlllbrlum 
generated by these agents must be such that V(c,,(s)) " Swhich Is the eQUatlOn 
defining ce(s). 
To study the eQUilibrium with the broker we must first underst8n~ how 
the search equl1ibrlum changes when "e changes. And then to analyse how 
IntrtWcing of the broker. changing its cosls Of of the structure of the brokerage 
20 
Industry d0es affect the w"! prople will split amoog searcllers end broker users. 
,/
, 
I 
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7, Search EguUlbrio 
Search «lullibria will be ;malysed, par.metrfu on the value of ce' By 
or,anging Ce wo orenge simultaneously the total number or entrants in the search 
merket and their distributions, 
Take the entrance rates as uniform In (O,C"J, And call A~ e c' the total 
number of ontra"ts in each side ofthe marKet Then E(c) = clc' and e(c) = l/c", 
If the limlt1ng'effort cost, separating those that engage In search from those that 
ooo't, Is "e <c", then tha entrants in the search market are given bY AE(Ce)= e Ce' 
The relevant distribution becomes E"(e} = CICe, and .-(c) = liCe, The 
distribution of current searchers by effort costs is F*( c) = -Ic/cg and the total 
population of current searcher is P= J27iE(c.) ".ffl.rc;rc:"= JTec,;, / • 
Price distributions are still uniform, centered at p, with aspread given 
by c, = 4/3 -Icsc"/2A = 4/3 rc;ng, For the sellers side tile optimal pricing 
policy .",j the volue of search function become: 
X*(Cl=P+~J%C' -~Are"=p.~ (%-~Jc 

.. 3 2A 3 2A 3 j--:;; 3 26 
- 2Jf"Ce [;" 2It /{;V(c)"P +- --.-2 -=p' - - - 2 ~ 
3 2A ~.~ 3 26 26 
The welfare benefits gener~ted by the existence of the marKet are, per 
22 
unit of time, B( ee) = AE( Ce)W =ewee; total search costs, also per unit of time ore 
Total welfare g;!ns Is given by ~-TS 
2J2 
B(ee) - TS(ee) =ewee--Je 0.312 
3 / 
For ony given value of cethe comparative static results obtained before still 
apply, 'w!th the same mterpretetions, The interesting Malysis now IS to make 
comparta!lve statics in Ca, No!1ce this Is quite a different exercise from the one 
made oofore by chooging c", both tollll numner of entrants and their distribution 
change simultaneously in a,very spacjfje way, 
Take on incre..... in ca' The <ay resull is that aA/Qce }0, This means that 
low effort cost sellers w!l1 raise their asking price and be better:off now 
ACtually all the "oid-tlmers" w111 Increase their asking price and be better-off 
than before, The new ootrants cause always a positive externality for ell those 
alroody in the market The new "lasH"lIer" is however worse off than the "old 
last seller", and will set a lower asking price, 
• 
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Y(c)x*(c) 
a 
2 cc 
e 
'Fig. 2: A Change in C s 
, 
This last result, that V(Sl) Is 6 decreasing function. meens that the 
demand for the broker's services Is well behO'/ed. In the sense that depenEls 
negatively on the margin he sets, 
/ 
/ 
In this case, when c increases the price policies are a£!justed In such e 
e 
W1/i that the number of contaCts each agent maKes to get a sale IncNllSes 
(n(c)·/CijTc). But, given the Increase In p. 11 Is easier to makes contact, and tM 
everage Sllarchlng Ums does not change (,(c) • 1/1200'), AS a consequence the 
total expected cost of search. for any agent does not change (T( c)",( 0),c',{c/28), 
The Individual welfare gain from participating In the market is V(c)='ji(c)-He). 
where pIc) is the expected sale price, The Increase In V(c) when Ce Increases Is 
exclusively due 'to an tncrease In p(c), ,However op(ce)/oce < 0, whloh Is 
'consistent with ViCe) being a decreasing fuootion, 
When one Introduce the broker the value of Ce w!IJ become encl:Jgenoous, 
Each &;JBnt will decide wether to search or use the broker, But he can also decide 
not to enter the market at all because the transection costs are too hlQh, It Is 
concelvab!c that some very high search CQSt sellers will OOClde not ot participate 
In 
, 
the search merket but ere wl11ing
, 
to use the brokers services at the price he 
sets. 
I 2 
c c c 
e a 
• 
V(C ) 
I 
c 
a 
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II. EQuilibrium Dod ODlimql PortJeiDattoD 
Aseller (buyer) will partiCipate In tM market,· and engage In searCll, 
only If the expected price ha gets, nat ofaxpected search costs, ts btg;Jer
-' ' (smaller) than his reservatton value:li( w): 
" ­V(c,,) =p- A)Yf 
(6,1) 
• 
Making as befere w= Vi - w, we get the equivalent contlltton A( CB}lWf2, 
which has as solution ce/c" , 9132 A( wlc")2. ' 
. .. \ 
Then' 
(t) If 9/32 A( w/c,,)2 < I, the BQulllbrlum participation Is partial and 
Calc" =9132A(wlc,)2 
(II) If 9/32 A(w/c") i I, the equllibrium participation Is full 
participation anti c" =c", 
New entrants, as we have seen, will cause an externality in those already 
particlpatlng. There IS then a reason to think that the optimal level of 
participation mil\' no coinCide with the equll1brlum, 
The (at.1 welf,re, net of search ,osts, is given by 
25 
2/2 

B- TS = ew c - -.fee 3/2
, e e 
-3 
The optimal p3rliclpelion is found by making 
3(8-TS) 

---·0 ,or 

C*s A W 
_~_(_)2 
c" 2 e" 
/
/ 
/6-TS 
- \ 
-,,-'-­
2 2 C 
A w 9 w e 
- (---) ---A(·-)
2 c· 8 c' 
Fig~ 3: Welfare as a Fur. .;tion of c 
e 
-------
------------- -----------
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So, if M2(w/c,,)2 ( llhe opllmal porticlpatlon is partial andgfven by 
ce/c'" A/2( w/c,,)2.o\herwlse the optimum Is full part1clpatton and Calc". I. 
Thrca cases are relevant 
( iii) (iI) (il 
> 
CASES 
(I) 
(jj) 
( III) 
.0 2 
----------------~----
PARTICIPATION 
. 
£qull1lJrlum Optimum 
FULLfULL 
FULLPARTIAL 
PARTIAL (, PARTIAL 
32 w 2 
A(-) 
9 
• 
/ 
------------------.------

WELfARE 
Equilibrium l Optimum 
9 2 w 2 
-A (-)w (same as 
64 c" 000'18) 
92w212w2 
-A(-) w -A (-)w 
64 c" 6· c" 
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2. Equilibrium wllb tile I!roker 
ThB beoker w1ll ooclde on lis pricIng pOlley, given by s. For any given 
value of s, the effort cost seper.Ung searohers from nrakers's users is given by 
• 
In this case V(c,,) = ji - " =S, and this leads to ce =9/8 e(p-sJ2. The 
totel numt:er of entrants In the soorCll marKet IS given by ACc,,) = Ac"/c' = 
9/8 e2(p-s)2, and the total search population, in equilibrium IS P=3/2 e( p-o). 
Assuming l~at the pricing polley of the broker IS such that no one leaves the 
merket, the demand for tha broker's services, in number of transaction per un II 
of lime is 
9 
D(s) =A - -02([;'-5)2 
8 ./ 
/ 
\ 
Simple computations establish that the total swreh costs per unit of time, by all 
porticipants in tM search morkal, ore given by 
9 
TS·-e2(p-s)3 (9,2) 
8 
To Isolate the pure Informatlooal aspects, when ooaling with the 
or!Jllnlzation of brokerage industry, I will assume a very simple cost structure 
for this activity: aconstant unit cost" per transaction, 
Then the profits of the in~us\ry are 
rr(s) = D(s)[2(p-s) -11 
28 
The extreme cas1lS, wh1lre the industry is competitive or fully 
monopolized. am dlS!:usse<) below. The case of 6 welfare-maximizing broKer is 
also studied. and Is use<) as abench-mort. 
The competilive equilibrium 10 \l1e brQker~ Induslry w1l11eOO to 
(9.3) 
The welfare oIOximlzlog broker will has as an objective 
mIn yD(s) + T5(s) 

s 

,/ 
/ 
when y DCs) Is tolel cosls of. the brokeralJ3lndustry end T5(s) lo\al search costs 
. 
ofthose eng<lglng in search (we keep assuming 2(ji-s) < w). The solutIon Is
. . 
(9.4) 
The mooopolist broK":' will maximize hIs profits ~Inst Ihe Oeflland 
D(s): 
max D(s)[2(p-s) - yJ 

s 

The solutIon is 
29 
2 
-+~-'-y (9.5) 
9 27 c2 . 3 
So It will always be 
(9.6) 
When tim brokers margin mcreases, slarllng from.1i - tf, some poople 
will switch from the brcKBr to)he S&lrch market. Thay will be In worse situation 
than before and so wlil be those slHylng with tM broker. But both the brokers 
profits and the 'old lI<ne seoreners" we'lfare will increase, Initially th~ two 
effects will mDre thon compensate tM losses. The optimal degree of corriwtltlon 
for the brokerage Industry will depend on the network externellty of the search 
market, which is, after all,'a market performing the same job OS the market for 
broker's services. As 11,. brOl<ers prle;; (margin) 9"ls bigger the relative size of 
the effecls WIll be .Iisted but the n,onopuly Sliuatlon is also not optimal. 
The total welfare, In eacI1 cese, cen be easily computed by noticing that it 
must be 
TW' Aw - Y D(s) - TS( 5) 
Thl$ leads to 
9 
TWr' A(w,) + -92 ,3 (9.7) 
64 
3Q 

t 
TWW'A(w-1)+-e213 (9.8) 
6 
t A_ 
TWM = A(w-,) + [_.2,2 - -] (p-SMl (9.9) 
4 3 
It Is not possible to get, In a sunpl. Wlfo/, TWM as funct10n only of the 
exogeneous parllmoters. But it Is not difficult \0 see that TWr '. TW~1If, Is smoll 
and that TWM > TWr If, Is big. An IncreaS'l In \he net C'lSt of the brol<er/9l 
tndustry weakens tho c~se for eompetltion This creates a definite l10k batween 
technological progress and the organl2lltlon of IndUstry. If, assoolated with new 
technologies, there IS a prcsumpt10n of dooraaslr.g costs, then 1\ wlll be optimal to 
. " 
allow a wrtaln degree of CO>'lOIl261Ioo. / 
, 
. We are now In aposition 
\ 
to evaluate tho welfere Impact of the.brcker/9l 
Industry (opening up a new market), when' theta was already a search market 
operollog. That impact will CBpend on the conditions prevailing belO",d the broker 
ma~1lS lis appearance and on the organization of the IndUstry. 
First take the cOmpetitive case, and assume that 9132 A(w/c")2 } t, so 
lhal the equilfbrlum before the br~er entailed full participation. 
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TW ;.f . 
AW .
. (B-TStULLi--=~;;::-------1--
-y y * o y 
• 
Fig. 4: Welfare with ·Competltive Broker 
. /
TWF(1) has a minimum 8t 1* = (8131"!)(c"IIA). Broker's demand 
becomes zero at yO =(412I3)(c"/.fA), and so at this point TWF =[6-TS]fULL, 
which Is the welfare wlttrout the broker. for ~ >yO there is no place for t~ 
broker. The other pOint at vlhlch TWf = [8-TS]FULL Is given by 
i=(./4/3(.fIO-¥'2X c"!/A). 
Some interesting pOInts rome out of this analysis, For one thlna, 
Introducing a brokerage Industry, evsn If It Is compet1tlve, may be welfare 
decreasing (1 > ~). Increasing the number of posslhle "channels of 
communication" among buye~s and seilers, IS not always a good thing. Also 
somewhat paradOXically, an ir.OfetlSB In the Unit costs may be welfare increasing 
(y* <1,,°). 
If wIs sufficiently smel;, It mllY happen that people will leave the market 
allilg9lher, rather lhan use too broker. This will hePPlln If y ) W, In tile 
competillve case. 
32 
The other two relevant cases (see page 25) are ooplcted below. 
1B-1SI 
PART. 
Fig. 5: Helfare and the Competitive Broke,/ 
/ 
/ 
• 
In both cases the equilibrium is partial, when the broke!' Is absent. When 
ygets to ,,0 no one will evel· IJ~P the broker·. For vI11ues of'Y <~o, there is asp lit of 
Ihe lolal population among sooroMrs and broker's users. In the second figure the 
equ111brlum before the broker Is a very bOO outcome and 11 Is always better to 
have abroker as long as, ( w. 
1\ welfare maxlmlzin<) broker will always Increase welfare, as could be 
antloipated. The thres value" 7*, ,0 will cmncloo and the counter-mtultwjl 
effecls 00 oot exIst. 
33 
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